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I 
A REPUBLIC OF NATIONS 
HE premiers of Great Britain and France, as well as T our own President, having given their adhesion to  the 
formation of a league of nations, I shall not undertake to  
argue the need of it. T h e  field of discussion is thus limited 
to the form the league ought to  assume. 
One of the plans proposed is that the nations unite in an 
association o r  league the three essential principles of which 
would be: ( I )  the organization of a court of arbitration 
for the adjudication of all international disputes that are of 
a legal o r  justiciable nature; ( 2 )  the organization of a 
council of reconciliation with jurisdiction of all political o r  
non-justiciable controversies; and ( 3 )  an obligation imposed 
upon the members of the league to exert their united force 
against any nation making war on another for any reason 
without having first offered to submit the controversy to 
arbitration o r  conciliation. 
In 
the first place, even had such a league been operative in 
1914, it may be doubted if it would have sufficed to  prevent 
the war. I t  certainly would not had the Central Alliance 
felt itself strong enough to  withstand the league in arms. 
In  any event, to escape the penalties of the league, it would 
only have been necessary for Austria to submit its contro- 
versy with Serbia to arbitration (as  Serbia suggested) and, 
upon a decision unfavorable to  Austria, then to  have de- 
clared war. Fo r  the plan demands that the united force of 
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T o  this plan several serious objections may be urged. 
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the league be used only to compel a submission of the dis- 
pute to arbitration o r  conciliation, not to compel an accept- 
ance of the decision. In the case, therefore, of an alliance 
like the Teutonic, o r  even of a single strong nation, resolved 
on war, the net result of this plan would seem to  be a t  most 
only to postpone hostilities for the six months o r  year re- 
quired for the process of arbitration o r  conciliation. 
In the next place, since warfare will in large measure 
hereafter depend upon the whole-hearted consent of the 
peoples concerned, it would appear difficult to  guarantee in 
advance that one nation would be willing to plunge into war 
with another merely because the latter, for reasons satis- 
factory to itself, had failed to submit to  arbitration some 
controversy with a third nation, and had instead resorted 
to immediate war. If we may judge from the past, to  drive 
a nation to arms something more is needed than a techni- 
cal violation of a right in which that nation has no direct 
interest. 
F o r  example, let us assume the league to exist and 
America, Germany, and Russia to be members of it. A 
dispute arises between the two last named, and Russia, with- 
out waiting for arbitration o r  unwilling to  submit to it, de- 
clares war upon Germany. If the disputed point were of 
no intrinsic interest to America, as would be likely, it would 
be difficult to secure warm support by the American people 
of a war with Russia merely because of her refusal to arbi- 
trate. There  might be grave danger that we would look 
upon Russia as having violated a mere technical rule of 
procedure, the substantial justice of the dispute being un- 
known to  us, especially if we were on peculiarly friendly 
terms with Russia, o r  on unfriendly terms with Germany. 
In the last place, this plan treats only the symptoms and 
does not remove the cause of the disease. T o  leave the 
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nations in their recent state of rivalry, antagonism, and sus- 
picion and merely to propose that when the inflammable 
materials burst into flames efforts will then be made to  ex- 
tinguish them, is a much less satisfactory measure of precau- 
tion than would be the elimination of the danger of con- 
flagration. I t  is eminently desirable to  give to  the league 
such a form that, by reason of its own inner structure, it 
will aid in the substitution of international cooperation, con- 
fidence, and good will for international rivalries, jealousies, 
and suspicions. I t  is to  such a league, as I believe, that I 
wish to direct your attention briefly this morning. 
T h e  nations may consent t o  the creation of an interna- 
tional federal league, conferring upon it legislative and 
executive as well as judicial powers over matters of interna- 
tional concern, while leaving the individual nations in 
plenary control of all domestic and national affairs. T h e  
constitution of such a league would in some respects be more 
complicated than the first, but if successfully achieved it 
would be more effective. 
International controversies arise either over legal rights 
and duties (these we shall call “legal disputes”) o r  over con- 
flicting policies (which we shall term “political disputes”). 
Legal disputes are usually settled with little difficulty by 
arbitration or international courts, because they present 
merely questions of law o r  fact. But political disputes are 
not justiciable. They  cannot be determined by courts of law 
and not always by conciliation o r  mediation. 
F o r  instance, under present conditions it would be difficult 
to conceive of the United States consenting to  submit to 
arbitration o r  conciliation the question whether a great 
power shall be permitted to  violate the Monroe Doctrine 
and forcibly to acquire territory in Mexico, let us say. This  
would not be a question of law a t  all, but of self-preserva- 
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tion. There is no rule of international law by which the 
United States may prohibit to  European nations the acquisi- 
tion of territory in Mexico o r  South America. N o t  being 
a question of law, it could not be settled judicially, and, on 
the other hand, being a policy vital a t  present to the pro- 
tection of the United States, that government would be 
unwilling to  leave it to  an alien board of conciliation. 
Again, under present conditions Great Britain would 
doubtless take the same attitude touching the balance of 
power in Europe, and both countries would probably assume 
it with regard to  the “open door” in China. Instances could 
be multiplied of such policies which might cause war and yet 
are altogether beyond the realm of law. 
As international disputes are  classified into legal and 
political, so may the powers exercised by nations with respect 
to other nations be similarly classified. Out  of the exercise 
of alleged legal rights arise legal disputes; out of the ex- 
ercise of political powers arise political controversies. And 
as legal disputes can always be judicially determined by an 
international court, all that is needed to prevent wars upon 
such grounds is t o  provide a properly constituted interna- 
tional court for  the trial of these cases. 
But with regard to  the second class of disputes-the polit- 
ical questions-it is fa r  otherwise. So long as the nations 
are at liberty to  exert political powers the exercise of which 
gives rise to  political controversies, the organization of in- 
ternational courts is of little avail. Occasions will arise 
when self-preservation o r  vital interests will demand that 
a nation resort to  arms, not to courts. 
T h e  political powers the exercise of which leads to polit- 
ical disputes, and thus to  war, may be enumerated as 
follows : 
I .  T h e  regulation and control of international (as  op- 
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posed to domestic) commerce, without consulting the wishes 
of  other nations interested in the same commerce. 
2 .  T h e  acquisition of the territory of other nations to 
their detriment o r  that  of other states. 
3. T h e  tyrannical o r  oppressive treatment of the citizens 
of other countries. 
4. T h e  keeping of armies or  navies limited only by the 
desires of the state keeping them. 
5 .  T h e  making of alliances. 
6. Secret diplomacy. 
7 .  T h e  unlimited exercise of the war  power and its ac- 
companiments, such a s  spying. 
These are the powers the exercise of which keeps alive 
suspicions, jealousies, and antagonisms among the na- 
tions. They are  the war-breeders. If, then, we would have 
permanent peace, it would seem essential that  the nations 
be induced to forego their extreme sovereignty to the extent 
of surrendering these powers so fa r  as is needful to  assure 
sister nations that they.wil1 not be abused. 
A few of these powers ought not to be exerted at all, and 
might well be surrendered in any event, with o r  without a 
league of nations-for example, secret diplomacy and the 
tyrannical treatment of citizens of  other states. But the 
majority of them could not wisely be given up by the nations 
individually unless the power to control and regulate them 
were assumed by them all, acting jointly; that is, unless a 
league were organized in which all would be properly repre- 
sented, and which, in order to the exercise of such powers, 
must be clothed with legislative, executive, and judicial 
functions. 
Thus, i f  America should surrender her right to  control 
the international commerce in which she is specially inter- 
ested,-for instance, the Panama Canal,-she must first be 
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assured that no other nation will assume control of it. It 
must be placed under control of the league, in the decisions 
of which she will have proper representation-the same 
representation she would have in the league’s control of the 
Dardanelles, the Danish Sound, o r  the Suez Canal. Or if  
by an accident of geography a nation is cut off from seaports, 
the league’s control of international commerce would suf- 
fice to  prevent undue advantage being taken of her un- 
fortunate situation by neighboring countries. 
If America surrenders the right to acquire the territory 
of another state to  its detriment o r  that of other states, she 
may yet acquire it with the assent of the nation concerned 
and of the league. 
Should Great Britain surrender her unlimited right to 
keep armies and navies, she must still be empowered to keep 
enough of each adequately to police her extensive territories 
and her merchant marine. 
If the members of the league are not to possess the un- 
limited right to wage war, the protection they have thus 
surrendered must be supplied by the forces of the league. 
If, contrary to covenants, the citizens of one state are badly 
treated in another, it would be the duty of the league, 
through its international courts or otherwise, to protect 
them. 
These illustrations suffice to point out the league’s need of 
governmental powers, legislative, executive, and judicial, at 
least within the limited spheres already mentioned. 
T h e  existence of such powers implies a corresponding 
organization of the government of the league into legisla- 
tive, executive, and judicial departments, respectively. H e r e  
we encounter difficulties, some of which will be briefly 
examined. 
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 
FOR a century or more the nations have been accustomed 
to assemble in congress and conference for  the purpose 
of enacting international legislation. T h e  Hague  Confer- 
ences would even suggest a more o r  less permanent legisla- 
tive assembly of the nations. In  these conferences and 
congresses it has been customary to give to  each state repre- 
sented one vote, and no more, and to enforce the principle 
that no measure, though receiving a majority of the votes 
cast, should be binding upon any state without its assent. In 
other words, each has possessed an absolute veto upon any 
measure. 
But for that very reason these assemblies have been able 
to accomplish comparatively little in the way of legislation. 
No law-making body wherein unanimous consent is needed 
for the passage of every measure can function efficiently. 
T h e  rule of the majority must be recognized, unless in 
special cases. Especially would this be true in respect of 
the complex measures dealing with international commerce, 
banking, currency, and other international affairs that might, 
under the covenants creating the league, be submitted to its 
legislative department. 
T h e  two principal forces that would clamor for control 
of the league would be the great powers, representing great 
populations and influence in world affairs, on the one side, 
and the equal sovereignty and rights of all states, repre- 
sented by the majority of all the members of the league, on 
the other. 
Should the legislative body of the league be organized on 
the principle that each nation shall have an equal vote in 
virtue of equal sovereignty, regardless of population o r  
world influence, that would be to  subject the great powers 
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to the will of the majority of small nations. To this these 
powers would never consent. On the other hand, were 
population or influence made the measure of the vote each 
nation would cast in the Congress, then the great powers 
would preponderate and the small nations, though in a ma- 
jority, would be powerless against a combination of these. 
This would be equally unfortunate. 
A way out might be found, however, i f  every measure 
were required to be passed twice in the Congress (whether 
in the same chamber o r  in two separate chambers is not 
very material), the one vote being in accordance with the 
unequal populations or influence of the several states, the 
other according to the equal sovereignty of all the states, 
each having an equal voice, Thus  a measure that might pass 
on the first vote through the preponderant voices of the 
great powers would be halted on the second vote if  opposed 
by a majority of all the states, and vice versa. This would 
seem sufficient to insure a balance between the great powers 
on the one hand and the majority of the states on the other. 
Each would have a veto on the acts of the other. 
But there would yet remain the possibility of a conjunc- 
tion of great powers and a majority of the nations that 
might pass legislation oppressive to  the minority, beyond the 
powers conferred upon the league, and violative of the 
rights reserved by the individual states. T o  avert this 
danger a stipulation might be inserted to the effect that when- 
ever any nations are convinced that the legislative body is 
exceeding the powers granted to it, they may, under reason- 
able conditions of time and notice, veto the measure, in 
which event it would not become binding. 
A law-making body organized on such a basis, while suf- 
ficiently elastic to  pass legislation appropriate to its jurisdic- 
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tion, would seem to afford adequate protection to the vari- 
ous interests concerned. 
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 
THERE have been created in past years certain interna- 
tional bureaus, like those of the Postal Union and Agri- 
culture, for the purpose of carrying into effect the com- 
paratively simple regulations of certain international con- 
ventions; but their organization and structure would in no 
way fit them, o r  others like them, to execute the complex and 
precise legislation that might be expected from a properly 
organized legislative body. T h e  executive arm of such a 
government must be ever alert, clothed with adequate 
powers, and responsive to  the wishes and demands of the 
nations composing the league. 
The re  are two principal types of governmental executive 
organization, which are well represented by the British on 
the one side and the American on the other. In the former 
the executive power of the state is vested in a ministry re- 
sponsible a t  all times to  the legislative body and liable to 
recall by it a t  any moment. In the latter it is vested in one 
man chosen by the people for a definite term and responsi- 
ble to them only, save that he may be impeached by the 
legislature during his term of office for high crimes and 
misdemeanors. 
T h e  latter presents fewer chances, perhaps, of sudden 
political crises, and its single-man power enables it more 
easily to command the united support of the country in great 
emergencies, as in time of war ;  but the former is marked 
by greater and more immediate conformity to the wishes of 
constituents-a quality very desirable in a league of nations. 
T h e  mutual jealousies of the nations might be expected 
to veto any executive organization for the league that would 
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give to  a single man (and more o r  less to the nation to which 
he would belong) the vast power and influence that would 
inhere in such an office as that of president of the league, he 
not being subject to recall during a fixed term of office save 
by impeachment alone. 
A prime minister, chosen by the nations acting through 
the international legislature and subject to recall a t  any time 
by a vote or resolution of that body, presents a more feasible 
plan that might prove acceptable to  the nations, since each 
nation would have complete control of its legislative repre- 
sentatives. 
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT 
TOUCHING the judiiial department, it would be necessary 
to  establish a court possessing jurisdiction of all legal dis- 
putes that might arise between the several members of 
the league. No other than legal disputes could arise if 
we suppose the nations to have surrendered those political 
powers the abuse of which would lead to political contro- 
versies between them. 
Moreover, if the states of the league are to  surrender 
their power to wage war upon other states and to  compel 
a proper regard outside their own limits for the personal 
and property rights of their citizens, it would be essential 
that the league itself guarantee those rights and protect 
them through the agency of judicial tribunals established in 
each state, having jurisdiction not only to  enforce those 
rights but to  compel obedience to  the enactments of the 
league on the part  of individuals in each state that might 
seek to  violate them. 
T h e  methods of appointing and removing these interna- 
tional judges might well be a subject of discussion, did time 
permit. Perhaps the best plan would be to call for their 
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appointment by the executive authority of the nation in 
whose territory they would be expected to perform their 
functions, and for their removal for  bribery or other mis- 
demeanor by the legislative body of the league. 
From the international courts sitting in each state appeals 
must often be allowed to a Supreme Court so that uniformity 
might be attained throughout the league in the interpreta- 
tion of its enactments. T o  this Supreme Court might also 
be assigned the task of adjudicating the controversies aris- 
ing from time to time between the several states. 
T o  procure the proper performance of these most im- 
portant functions it is suggested that this court ought to  be 
so organized that each nation would be equally represented 
thereon. Its membership would doubtless be large enough 
to permit this. T h e  cases coming up to this tribunal from 
all over the world would be numerous. I t  would probably 
be necessary to divide the court into sections, one to  deal 
with disputes between nations, one with appealed civil cases, 
and a third with appealed criminal cases. 
T h e  justice and propriety of an equal representation on 
this court appear from the following considerations. T h e  
court is established in part  for the adjudication of national 
rights, wherein all the nations would be equal. T h e  ques- 
tions it would be called on to  decide ought not to  be de- 
termined by the weight of influence or wealth of the litigants, 
but by the weight of justice and reason only, in which re- 
spects also the nations would be equal, whatever their size 
o r  resources. T h e  custom of nations in arbitration proceed- 
ings has been to  submit their disputes to  tribunals consisting 
of an equal number of representatives of the contending 
nations, regardless of their respective populations, wealth, 
o r  influence, with an impartial umpire. In  every litigation 
between two of the nations o r  between the league and a state 
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or its citizens, each nation, though no actual party to the con- 
troversy, would possess an interest in the decision and in 
the precedents thereby established almost equal to  that of 
the litigants themselves. 
Time does not permit of the presentation of other prob- 
lems that would arise in the formation of such a league as 
is here advocated. They are many and difficult, but with 
patient investigation would doubtless prove capable of 
solution. 
One more observation, however, before I conclude. T h e  
organization of any sort of league of nations to secure per- 
manent peace is a grand experiment in world government. 
T h e  best hope that the nations may enter into it would seem 
to lie in the frank admission that it is but an experiment, and 
in the stipulation that i f ,  after a fair and full trial, any na- 
tion is convinced that its continuance in the league will entail 
upon it too great a loss of sovereignty o r  liberty, it shall be 
permitted to withdraw in peace and to resume unhampered 
the complete independence and freedom of action it now 
enjoys as a sovereign state. 
RALEIGH COLSTON MINOR, 
